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Abstract  
In this paper I describe three patterns in the emergence of Indian Entrepeneurs 
Indian large scale industries, 1850-1930. While doing this I focus on three 
variables: (1) the colonial attitude towards indigenous business, especially the 
transformation towards large scale industrialisation1; (2) the religious, 
occupational and regional background of industrialists to be; and (3) whether or 
not they belonged to a ‘minority’ group. While these patterns all led to the 
successful entry of Indian businessmen into large-scale industries, they differ in 
the explainable importance to be attributed to the different variables. This 
paper starts with a description of the entry of Marwari businessmen into the 
jute industry in Calcutta. This will be followed by the success of the Parsi 
community in the cotton industries of Bombay and finally the story of the Hindu 
industrialists in Ahmedabad. In the final section, these three patterns of 
industrialisation will be compared. 
1.0 Introduction2
The social sciences have developed a plethora of explanations in describing the 
success -and to a far lesser extent the failure- of individual entrepreneurs as well as 
various business communities in World History. The most well known explanations 
and theories include: the concept of the stranger (Simmel); the spirit of capitalism 
(Weber); the innovator and the imitator (Schumpeter and Hoselitz); the collaborator 
(Gallagher and Robinson, in Louis) and the middlemen minorities (Bonacich and 
Dobbin).3 Despite these long and varied theoretical traditions, we are still unable to 
explain the why and how some families among indigenous middlemen minorities 
develop towards industrialists in colonial contexts, whereas others don’t.  
Simmel argues that migrant traders who decided to settle in their host 
societies are ‘strangers’. This might help them in developing their business. On the 
one hand they may fill economic niches which local business communities were not 
allowed to, like selling liquor. On the other hand they develop a more detached 
attitude towards the local markets which may help hem to set prices at a more 
profitable rate. Weber argued that there is a strong relation between the religious 
background of entrepreneurs and their capitalistic entrepreneurial ethic. He shows 
that particular in the Protestant religion people developed an ethic where hard work, 
(re)investing, long term perspectives and rationally calculating risks became a primary 
aim of the business community. Bonacich and Dobbin build upon the work of Weber 
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and Simmel by arguing that it were especially minorities who became successful 
entrepreneurs. Because of their minority status (and as a consequence, the suffering 
of all kinds of discrimination, like not allowed to own land, not allowed to do certain 
jobs etc) they develop a stronger motivation to show that they can become 
successful. In addition to this, Gallagher and Robinson argue, that because of their 
minority status some local business communities were suitable middlemen to 
support the colonial empires abroad. Because of the fact that these businessmen 
belong to non majority groups many colonial governments supported these groups 
as their local suppliers, translators, informants etc. In this way these groups are seen 
as ‘collaborators’ in the Marxist as well as many nationalist historiography. 
In this paper I argue that in different historical contexts some theories 
become more fruitful than others, whereas in other contexts they fail to explain the 
emergence of local industrialists. By describing three patterns of industrialisation in 
India I focus on three variables: (1) the colonial attitude towards indigenous business, 
especially the transformation towards large scale industrialisation4; (2) the religious, 
occupational and regional background of industrialists to be; and (3) whether or not 
they belonged to a ‘minority’ group. While these patterns all led to the successful 
entry of Indian businessmen into large-scale industries, they differ in the explainable 
importance to be attributed to the different variables. 
By comparing these variables we will be able to recognise that, e.g. the British 
in India stimulated the Parsis to settle in Bombay and run their businesses there, 
whereas they had a hostile attitude towards the Marwai business community in 
Calcutta. In short; there was not such a thing as one ‘colonial attitude’ towards local 
business communities. Along the same line it is argued that the Parsis in Bombay 
were successful because of their minority status and their (protestant like) work 
ethic. Therefore the Parsis were the pioneers of the Bombay cotton Industry. 
However, the pioneers in the Ahmedabad cotton textile industries, were not a 
minority group, they were Hindus who (according to Weber) were not known for 
their worldly (capitalist) outlook. It will be shown that the entry of local business 
groups in large-scale industries in a colonial setting is a complex an varied process. 
By comparing three different cities, three different industries and three different 
business communities we may be able to show some fresh light on this complex 
theme. 
This paper starts with a description of the entry of Marwari businessmen into 
the jute industry in Calcutta. This will be followed by the success of the Parsi 
community in the cotton industries of Bombay and finally the story of the Hindu 
industrialists in Ahmedabad. In the final section, these three patterns of 
industrialisation will be compared. 
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2.0 Calcutta’s Industrial Transformation: Marwari Competitors 
At the end of World War I, the imperial sun was probably at its highest in Calcutta. 
The most important buildings of the British managing agency houses of Andrew Yule, 
Bird and Heilgers, and Duncan Brothers literally dominated the area around 
Dailhouse Square, the economic and political centre of the city. At that time, no 
Indian Sahib would have believed that they could challenge British supremacy in the 
Calcutta jute industry. However, this is exactly what happened. Slowly and subtly, 
the Marwaris increased their influence in the jute industry and finally started their 
own jute mills and became competitors to British jute industrialists in Calcutta. 
2.1 Colonial attitude towards Marwaris 
The Marwaris originally came from Marwar, a region in Rajasthan in Northwest 
India.5 They were known as keen businessmen, traders and, bankers. During the 
nineteenth century they migrated from Marwar to various parts of India. According 
to Timberg, this was a consequence of colonial rule. First of all, some them lost their 
principal position as financiers of the princes of Rajasthan. Others shifted in 
accordance with their trade interests to the main ports of India, i.e., Calcutta, 
Bombay, and Madras. The emergence of British traders opened new opportunities 
for Marwaris as financiers of British trade and as middlemen between the British 
(international) and local markets. 
In 1881, there were no less than 9000 Marwaris in Bengal. Because of their 
growing business interest this rapidly grew. Between 1891 and 1931, the number of 
Marwaris in Bengal varied from 33.000 to 51.000.6 The British in Calcutta did not 
welcome the Marwaris. The felt that it was necessary to deal with them, because of 
their knowledge of the inland market and to secure the supply of raw jute for the 
British owned jute factories. However, one had to be alert; they were not seen as 
friends or even formal collaborators: they were seen as competitors. Their strength 
was that they were not formally organised and therefore were not obliged to follow 
formal rules. This made them not popular with the more formally organised British. 
Take, for example, the attitude of British Jute mill owners in the early twenties. One of 
them, M.P. Thomas of Bird, singled out G.D. Birla, the Marwari business spokesman at 
that time, as the villain of the piece: ‘He has done more to encourage new mills than 
anyone. If he can’t get us out by kicking us out, he will try to get us out by unfair 
competition.’7 During the depression when there were internal problems in the Indian 
Jute Mill Association, Marwaris were frequently referred to as ‘short sighted 
industrialists’, ‘mugs with money,’ and ‘pirates’.8 Whenever a Marwari attempted to 
enter the industry, he was ‘up to do some dirty work’.9 How then was it possible that 
the Marwaris could enter the industry, which was from its beginnings in the early 
1850s dominated by the British? 
2.2 The Marwari transition to industries. 
The transformation of a few Marwari families from ‘traders to industrialists’ was 
gradual. This pattern can be described in the following steps: (A) They slowly 
increased their importance in the trade of raw jute and jute manufactures; (B) Some 
of the Marwari traders became members of the formal jute-trade organisations. 
Others became brokers to British managing agency houses, or, by buying shares got 
a place on the board of directors of British managing agency houses; (C) Finally, in 
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the early 1920s, a few Marwaris entered the jute industries by setting up their own 
jute mills. 
(A) Importance in jute trade and finance 
In Calcutta the Marwaris built on their traditional occupations as traders and 
bankers. They had settled as small traders, financiers, and brokers to mainly British 
trading firms. They were often mediators between the international market, which 
was dominated by the British, and the Indian market, which in Bengal was dominated 
by the Marwaris. From an 1864 Directory, it appears that more than 50 per cent of 
the Indian bankers in Calcutta were Marwari. The importance of the Marwari 
bankers is confirmed by the British-dominated Bengal Chamber of Commerce that 
complained that: 
The indigenous banking system favoured their own Marwari friends and they 
did not put their money in bank stocks, where it could serve the general 
trading interest.10  
 
However, the Marwaris did not only favour their own Marwari friends, they 
were simply cheaper than their British competitors. In 1904 British ship owners 
informed the Calcutta Jute Mill Association (an organisation of British jute mill owners) 
that it was cheaper to buy jute manufactured goods through native traders than 
through European brokers: 
 
(…) business in jute manufactured goods can be transacted on more 
favourable terms through native brokers than it is possible to obtain when 
business is done through European brokers (…) they return 0,5 per cent of 
their commission to buyers, which is in direct contravention of the rules of the 
Jute Fabric Brokers Association.11
 
Their Indian background and knowledge of local transport and finance made it 
possible for the Marwaris to find economic niches next to European traders. Finally, a 
division of markets appeared where the Marwaris dominated the local and Indian jute 
trade and the British traders were primary exporters.12
From the membership lists of the Jute Balers Association, founded in 1892, it 
becomes clear that a growing number of Marwaris were among its members. Initially, 
European traders dominated the association, but in the beginning of the twentieth 
century the number of Indians, especially Marwaris, was growing. In 1903/04, 133 
members were listed, 70 of whom were Indians and of these 45 were Marwaris.  
Fifteen years later, 137 members were Indians, which was 63 per cent of the total 
membership.13 Among them were industrialists to be, like G.D. Birla, Sir Onkarmull 
Jatia and Goenka. 
(B) Shareholders, brokers and directorships 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, a few Marwari families had developed close 
commercial links with British managing agencies. These agencies were privately held 
joint stock companies or, more frequently, partnership firms. On the strength of past 
managerial performance, they floated shares to build new jute mills or other 
companies. Owing to oversubscribtion and stock exchange regulations, it was 
possible to control a mill in spite of owning less than 10 to 20 percent of the shares.  
The Marwari firms initially offered raw jute to these British agencies. In 
addition they sometimes offered short term credit to finance the supply of jute. 
Furthermore, they eventually financed new jute mills by buying shares or giving long 
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term loans to the British agents. In return for their growing financial share in these 
managing agencies, the Marwaris finally got themselves on the boards of the agencies 
and were jointly with the British managers responsible for the floating of jute mills. 14
During the inflationary years of the early 1920s, many European managed 
companies found themselves undercapitalised, strapped for funds, and needing cash to 
expand capacity in their jute mills. Marwaris provided these funds in exchange for their 
entrance to the various boards of directors. In this way they could secure the 
purchase of raw jute. Despite the earlier unfavourable political and economic climate 
some Marwaris, now were allowed to build up close relationships with the White 
Sahibs. The Jatia family, for example, developed close ties to the Andrew Yule 
Company. More specifically, David Yule was a close friend of Onkarmull Jatia; the 
Goenka family had a close connection to Bird and Heilgers and the Kanorias were 
connected to McLeod. In this process of growing collaboration,  the Marwaris were 
able to learn the ins and outs of jute-mill management. 
Goswami provides us with a detailed description of the increasing influence of 
Marwaris in the jute-mill industries. In 1918, out of 114 seats in the board of directors 
of British managing agencies in the Calcutta jute industry the British occupied 111 
(97,4%). A clear reflection of their managerial control over the industry. However, this 
changed rapidly, and in 1930, 57 per cent of jute mill companies managed by 
‘European’ managing agencies had Marwaris in their board of directors. In a quarter of 
the total number of ‘European’ managing agencies, the Marwaris had equality on the 
board. In one case, the Marwaris outnumbered the number of European directors.15 
The companies increasing shortage of capital explain this sudden entry of Marwaris on 
the boards of directors of British managing agencies; the losses made by British mills 
and the decrease in the rate of returns of various mills. 
(C) Industrialists 
The transition from trade to industry is not necessarily a linear process, whereby 
having accumulated sufficient capital, the merchant capitalist decides one fine day to 
move into industry. Some forms of prior association with the industry, either as a 
middleman supplying inputs or as one dealing with finished products is a critical 
factor, provided, of course, that there are no major entry barriers such as those 
found in a typical early colonial phase. The relative weakening of entry barriers that 
occur during wars or because of a depression in which the terms of trade swing in 
favour of industries can have the cumulative effect of facilitating entry into industries. 
This does not imply, however, that having realised the advantages of industrial 
investment and having ploughed a certain amount of capital in industry, the merchant 
capitalist would progressively increase his association into industry. This may or may 
not happen. In the colonial context, it is more likely that the entrepreneur would be 
inclined to play it safe by maintaining a diversified investment portfolio combining 
investment in industry with trade and indigenous banking. The question of relative 
rates of return becomes important.16
To answer the question of relative rates of return, we need the business 
sources from the family level. However, they hardly exist. Large parts of Marwari 
family business are informally organised. Even when they kept accounts of business 
records they were destroyed or not available for research etc.. It is therefore difficult 
to give an impression of the relative rates of return from the family level. 
Nevertheless, family histories show that Marwaris from various occupational 
backgrounds entered the jute industry. They did so by accepting a smaller rate of 
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return than their British counterparts and in a context where profits in other sectors 
(trade, banking, coal, etc.,) were under increased pressure. 
2.3 Family histories 
The famous Birla family started their first jute mill in association with Hukumschand 
in 1919. By then, these families were already running three cotton mills in Delhi and 
Indore. The founding father of the Birla imperium G.D. Birla, settled in Calcutta in 
the beginning of the twentieth century. He had a background in jute and opium trade 
and finance.  Additionally, he was broker to the Managing Agent of Andrew Yule. 
This managing agent was one of the few agents which was known for its liberal pro-
Indian attitude. Birla was a respected member of the Board of Directors of various 
mills under the Yule agents. But even at the Yule offices he was not allowed to use 
the elevator, and he was obliged to use the stairs.17
Sarupchand Hukumchand made his money with banking and speculating on the 
opium market. In the early twentieth century he settled in Calcutta where he was very 
lucky in his speculative business. In 1910 he used borrowed money to buy Rs 200.000 
worth of opium, which within a month yielded tenfold that amount. In 1915 he opened 
a very profitable trading office in Calcutta. By then, he already owned cotton mill in 
Indore. However, without much knowledge of jute industries he became a partner in 
Birla’s first jute venture. Nevertheless, speculation and opium trade remained his most 
important source of income. 
Reading through different family-histories of Marwari industrialists we may 
compose the following table which shows a variety in patterns in which Marwaris 
became associated with jute industries. 
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Table1 
The transformation from traders to industrialists of some Marwari-families. 
 
Family name Trader/ 
banker 
Broker/speculator Board of 
Director in 
British firm 
Industrialist 
Birla Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jalan Yes No No Yes 
Singhania Yes No Yes Yes 
Bangur Yes - Yes Yes** 
Goenka Yes Yes Yes Yes* 
Hukumchand Yes No no Yes 
Jatia Yes No Yes No 
 
-  no information available 
*       By the failure of two British Managing Agencies, McLeod and Octavius 
Steel, not by starting a mill themselves 
**     By buying the British Managing Agency Kettlwell Bullen & Co. 
Sources: See G. Oonk, Het geheim van de Marwaris. Een onderzoek naar Indiaas 
ondernemerschap, 1900- 1939, eindscriptie Erasmus Universiteit, 1991, 61. (G. Oonk, 
Secrets of Marwaris: A study towards Indian Entrepreneurship, 1900-1939, 
unpublished MA-thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam.) 
 
Table 1 shows that the transformation from ‘trader to industrialist’ is not as 
systematic as suggested by e.g. Timberg. At first sight, the patterns of Birla, Goenka 
and Bangur are similar. These three families have a background in trade and/or finance 
and/or speculation. They had all worked as brokers for British managing agents and 
were active on the board of directors in their agencies. Finally, they started their own 
jute mills. Nevertheless, differences remain important. The Birlas started their first 
jute-mill in 1919, whereas Goenka and Bangur started jute-mills after the Second 
World War and an independent India was on the come. Neither of the last two 
families built their own mills, but took over loss-making mills of the British Agents they 
worked for. They became industrialists by accident, whereas Birla had build his own 
mills. 
For most families, industrialisation is a matter of diversification and not their 
primary aim.  From a list of 510 Marwari firms, only about 100 held more then 50% of 
their assets in industrial investments.18 Almost all Marwari families remained faithful to 
their traditional occupations of trade, finance, and speculation. 
2.4 Concluding observations 
The first part of this paper shows that the Calcutta pattern, in which the Marwari 
business community competed with the Scottish jute industrialists and finally 
dominated the industry, is a slow and subtle process. The British, needed mediators 
in trade and finance, but did not welcome the Marwaris. Marwaris were seen as 
‘mugs’ with money. The British could not think of a mutual profitable relationship 
and saw them only as necessary evil. 
The Marwaris provided the British with raw jute, short term credit and long 
term loans. They did not develop through a linear transition from trader to 
industrialists. Not surprisingly, all industrialists-to-be had a background in trade and 
finance; only a few were brokers or occupied a seat on the board of directors of 
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managing agents. A trader/finance background and being active on the board of 
directors would not necessarily lead to becoming an industrialist, as becomes clear 
from the Jatia family in Table 1. 
The Marwaris are an example of a migrant Hindu/Jain minority which was 
able to follow the Scottish example of jute industrialists and flourish economically 
within a politically and economically unfavourable colonial context. Though, this was 
what happened, we must not overestimate the industrial success of the Marwaris. 
Only about ten families, owing less then fifteen jute factories were able to do so. 
One last observation is the explanation for the success of the Marwaris. 
Though scientists have formulated a plethora of explanations (Protestant ethic, migrant 
minorities, collaborators) there is one that returns to my mind all the time. Marwaris 
who did not succeed in Calcutta generally returned to their properties in Marwar and 
Shekawati. This meant that only ‘successful’ Marwaris remained in Calcutta. Therefore 
a fair description of Marwaris in Calcutta is 'successful trader or banker’ from Marwar, 
Rajasthan.  
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3.0 Bombay’s Industrial Transformation. A symbiosis of Parsis 
and Britons 
The imperial sun in Bombay never shone with the same intensity as it did in Calcutta. 
Up to 1750, Surat -and not Bombay- was the economic centre of West India. The 
establishment of the headquarters of the British East India Company (BEIC) in 
Bombay in1672 was not sufficient for its prosperity. The socio-economic 
development of Bombay was due to a symbiotic relation of Parsis and Britons. This 
relation is currently symbolised by the Victoria railway station and opposite the main 
Rd in front of the station the statute of Daoroji Naoroji, named after this important 
Parsi spokesman and founder of the Indian National Congress. 
3.1 Colonial attitude towards Parsis 
Gerald Aungier, governor of the EIC in West India, realised that the prosperity of 
Bombay depended as much on the British businessmen as on indigenous traders, 
moneylenders, and, artisans. He and his followers succeeded in persuading local 
Indian businessmen to put themselves, and their capital under the protection of the 
BEIC.19 Moreover, these traders were offered a minimum price for the products 
they sold to the EIC, and they were exempted from levies on imports and exports.20 
In other words, they were invited to settle in Bombay and the British made it 
profitable to do so. 
The mutual relation between Parsis and the British in Bombay is sharply 
contrasted by the hostile relation between Marwaris and the British in Calcutta. In 
Calcutta the BEIC had a monopoly on foreign trade, whereas the BEIC in Surat 
competed with the French and Dutch companies. Consequentley therefore it was 
more necessary to attract local traders as collaborators. The relation between the 
Parsis and British in Bombay was a continuation of their mutual relations in Surat. As 
the Parsis in Surat only had an economic merely independent status, the British had to 
create an attractive economic environment to persuade the Parsis to migrate to 
Bombay.  Second, the Parsees had a proven loyalty towards the British. They partly 
financed the military defence of the Bombay fort; they were loyal to the British during 
the Mutiny (1857), financing the British military apparatus. Third, a part of the Parsee 
community was fast to recognise that is was very useful to learn English, to adopt 
British customs and to intensify their relation with the British in order to improve the 
socio-economic position of the community in West India.21
The Parsis were known as hard workers, keen and reliable traders, and loyal to 
the British: 
They are an industrious people and indigenous in trade, wherein they totally 
employ themselves. There are at the present but few of them but we expect a 
greater number, haveing [sic] gratified them in their desire to build a bureing 
[sic] place for their dead on the Island.22
 
Throughout the Rebellion [1857] in the East, the Parsees have maintained an 
unshaken loyalty to the British whom they are proud to call their fellow sub-
jects, and while preserving their own independence of religion and customs, 
their chief desire is that British rule in India should be consolidated upon a 
basis of strict justice and mutual interest.23
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Within this mutual relationship between Britons and Parsis, some parsi 
families developed from traders to industrialists.  
3.2 Trade, finance and artisans 
In the early nineteenth century, around 5000 Parsis lived within Bombay Fort, 
whereas only one Hindu trader owned a house at that time.24 According to my own 
research, the Parsis accounted for up to 20 per cent of the Bombay population 
around 1850. This decreased to 7 per cent in 1881. This sudden reduction of the 
relative number of Parsis was due to the huge numbers of Hindu and Muslim 
migrants who settled in Bombay in that period.25 In other words, from a ‘majority 
group’ in Bombay Fort, they became group in proper Bombay. 
The Parsis became translators, traders, moneylenders, bankers, and artisans. 
The British directly occupied a small group of Parsis, but most of them were self-
employed. They occupied half of Bombay-Island and they were the owners of the 
Indian merchant navy.26 Huge profits were earned by Parsis who traded in raw 
cotton (designed for the Manchester cotton factories) and opium with China. 
Especially those profits were used to build the Indian cotton industry in Bombay. 
 At the end of the eighteenth century, Nasarvanji Kavasji Petit27 migrated from 
Surat to Bombay.  By then, he was a well-known broker and `dubashi' (translator) to 
French, Dutch and British traders. In 1848, he bought his own ship. While working 
for the British trading firm of Dirom Richmond he was allowed to trade on his own 
account. He mainly traded raw cotton with Britain and opium with China. Both were 
very lucrative. His son Dinshaw Petit (1823-1901) started working in his late teens as a 
clerk for Dirom Richmond & Co. In the beginning, Dinshaw earned a very modest 
salary of about Rs15 a month. His main duty was to co-ordinate the opium trade with 
China. He rapidly worked his way up and, in a short time, his salary increased to 
Rs100/ a month. Furthermore, he was given, according to the contemporary custom, 
the privilege of trading a little on his own account under the auspices of the firm.28 
Dinshaw and his brother Nassarvanji inherited their father's company in 1859. 
Nassarvanji had always worked for his fathers' company and he was closely involved in 
his father initiative to start their first cotton mill. Dinshaw, while shifting from Dirom 
Richmond & co. to the Petit family business, started a cotton mill in the early sixties. 
The Petits built more mills after the economic success of their first mills. Yet, they 
never forgot that trading was their original background. This meant that they 
continued tradinn in raw cotton and opium with Europe and China, while trade in 
cotton yarn and cloth (produced in their mills) became more and more important. 
The Parsis were among the first to build up the Indian cotton textile industry in 
Bombay. Parsis owned nine of ten mills built in Bombay between 1854 and 1863. This 
included two mills of the Petit family. In the period between 1878 and 1915, the Parsis 
owned between 41 and 30 per cent of the mills in the city.29 Considering the fact that 
the Parsis never counted more than 7 per cent of the population of Bombay in the 
period 1881-1915, it is clear that the Parsis were over-represented as millowners in 
Bombay. Yet, other communities like Gujaratis, Bhatias (both mainly Hindus), Moslims 
and Jains became increasingly important in this period. 
Let us return to the Petit family. In my view, they represent a common pattern 
in Bombay of cotton and opium traders developing into cotton millowners. This 
pattern includes several aspects that are unique for Bombay and two more general 
aspects. First, they had been working for British trading firms. Second, they had had 
experience in international trade, especially opium trade with China and raw cotton 
trade with London. Third, they never became producers pur sang, but they continued 
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their trading activities. Fourth, most of the millowners in Bombay (or their) fathers 
were not born in Bombay, they came from Gujarat. 
 
Tabel: 2 
Examples of the Bombay Pattern: From traders to Industrialists 
 
Name of the 
family 
Industrialist Cotton Trade Opium Trade Broker Shipowner 
      
Petit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wadia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Thackersey Yes Yes Unknown Yes Unknown 
Tapidas 
Varajadas 
Yes Unknown Unknown Yes Unknown 
 
Source: Oonk (1998), 90. 
 
 (1)The most remarkable aspect of the Bombay pattern is the fact that many 
Indian business families- mainly the Parsis30- sent their sons to work in a British 
trading firm. Thus, Dinshaw Petit worked as a clerk and translator for the British 
firm of Dirom Richmond. The Wadia family traded for various British firms and they 
even built ships for them.31 The Thackersey family worked for several European 
firms such as the trading firms of Goddam Bythel & Co., and Soloman Betch & Co. 
With the exception of the Birla and Jatia families, this pattern did not occur in 
Calcutta. 
(2) British firms formed a direct link between Indian traders and international 
markets. Naturally, international trading links had existed even before the British 
entered India, but their entrance strengthened these international links. While working 
for British trading firms, Indians gathered more information about foreign markets and 
experienced the practice of international business. They started to trade on their own 
account and accumulated huge amounts of money, especially in the opium trade with 
China. In the meantime, these Indian businessmen informed themselves about the 
Industrial Revolution in Lancashire. The famous J.N. Tata, for example, was known for 
his detailed knowledge of the cotton industry in Manchester, its management, finance 
and production potential.32  
(3) Indian cotton industrialists were hardly ever just millowners.33 Their family-
based business included (international) trade (and often shipowners), banking, 
landownership, and various other activities. My major interest was the management of 
the mills. During my research it became clear that, in some cases, the millowners had 
used their mills as a trading or even speculative unit rather than a unit of production. 
They speculated in land belonging to the mills’ premisses. They would buy and sell raw 
cotton, without producing cloth in periods of rapid changes in the cotton price. And, 
they slowly included the wholesale of cotton products in their spheres of interest.  
 
It should however be pointed out that these results [huge profits of the 
Bombay cotton mills in 1912, G.O.] were due in many cases to the 
extraordinary profits by the mill agents on the sale of cotton and not on the 
sale of yarn and cloth. 34
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Without making any moral judgement about these activities, it became clear to 
me that their trading background deeply influenced the way they managed their mills 
and the role the mills played in their family- business activities.35
(4) Most of the cotton industrialists in Bombay, originally came from Gujarat. 
Many Parsis came from Surat and Navsari. Bhatias came from Cutch and Jains came 
from various places around Ahmedabad. 
The most remarkable aspect of the Bombay pattern is that many `industrialists- 
to-be'  had worked for European trading companies before they started their own 
mills. In many cases they traded on their own account while working for Europeans. 
For Bombay I selected a list of 92 mills (Rutnagur 1927). I was able to acquire reliable 
information about the occupational background of their promotors from nearly half of 
the mills (45). It appeared that more than 80% of the early industrialists had initially 
worked for a managing agency (mostly British, sometimes French, and, in a few cases, 
agencies of Parsis)36. In addition, 90% of the cotton industrialists had been traders in 
cotton and/or opium.37
3.3 Conclusion: 
The Parsi traders acted as intermediaries for British traders in the Indian 
market. They also worked for British trading houses, where they learned the ‘ins and 
outs' of international trade.38 There was a mutual interest between the British and the 
Parsees. The British stimulated the Parsees to invest in Bombay, to become junior 
partners and to trade with them.  In the nineteenth century, they came across the 
mechanisation process in Britain.They started to diversify their activities by establishing 
their own cotton industry in Bombay. This pattern may suggest that being a 
(migrant)trader with experience in the international market and with British trading 
houses were necessary conditions to become a cotton industrialist in India. However, 
this Bombay pattern was essentially different from the way entrepreneurs in 
Ahmedabad became cotton industrialists.  
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4.0 Ahmedabad's Industrial Transformation  
from Bankers to Industrialists 
There was no imperial sun in Ahmedabad. A few rays of imperial sunshine may 
be appeared after 1818 when the British officially started to rule Ahmedabad. 
However, the old city preserved its traditional structure of guilds and castes as well as 
its commercial outlook. The British created a stable, reliable bureaucratic system, a 
less exploited tax system (compared to the Moghul and the Marathi rulers) and 
therefore a potential for economic growth. They did not shape the skylines of the 
economic centre as they did in Calcutta and Bombay. Indians built Ahmedabad and its 
transition to industry was an indigenous affair, in which the British businessmen only 
played a background role. 
4.1 History and migration 
Ahmedabad was originally founded for administrative and military reasons. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, it transformed to a more commercial city. 
Though, the city was generally known for its wealth, trade, and commerce, its 
history shows a remarkable development in economic growth as well as decline. In 
the early eighteenth century, many weavers, traders, and artisans fled the city 
because of the war between the Moghuls and Marathis. However, owing to the 
active policy of de British, indigenous traders and weavers settled again in 
Ahmedabad in the nineteenth century. Thus, in 1818, Ahmedabad had 80.000 
inhabitants, which gradually grew to 181.000 in 1901. 39
The British played no role in the commercial life of Ahmedabad. They were 
government officials, but not traders or bankers. They had no role as intermediates for 
Ahmedabad businessmen. There was neither a positive colonial attitude (as in Bombay) 
nor a negative attitude (as in Calcutta) towards them.  Initially, it was the Indian 
colonial civil servant Ranchodlal Chhotalal who approached British administrators as 
well as businessmen to assist with his plan to build a cotton textile factory. When this 
mill proved to be successful, others –mainly bankers- followed his example. 
 
Ranchhodlal Chhotalal was a traditional Nagar Brahmin in Ahmedabad. This was a 
high ranked, non- commercial Hindu caste. Most of them, like Ranchhodlal, were 
educated and trained for government jobs.  Ranchhodlal started his career in 1842 as 
a clerk in a government office, but he soon became `Assistant Superintendent to the 
Political Agent of Reva Kantha', the highest appointment an Indian could get at that 
time. Ranchhodlal was serious interested in a project in Surat, where a cotton mill was 
build by Britishers. He contacted a British official, James Landon, who had a strong 
relation with the British machine industry. From Landon, he obtained cost estimates, 
which proved that a cotton mill in Ahmedabad could be profitable. This was in 1847 
already, i.e., before the Parsis started cotton mills in Bombay. Even after a British 
investor guaranteed fifty per cent of the investments, the Ahmedabad bankers were 
not interested. It took him more than seven years to convince the bankers of 
Ahmedabad of the profitability of the project. Finally, in 1858, after the mills in 
Bombay proved profitable, Ahmedabad bankers invested in the mills.  
 
What is important here is that Ranchhodlal came from a very traditional Hindu caste.40 
This example shows that someone with a very traditional Hindu background, could 
become a millowner. Only after his success, (Hindu/Jain) bankers in Ahmedabad 
decided to build cotton mills on their own account. 
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4.2 From bankers to industrialists 
The occupational background of textile industrialists in Ahmedabad differs from their 
counterparts in Bombay. None of them had any experience in a British trading firm 
or had ever worked as a ‘broker' for a European trading company, as often was the 
case in Bombay. Of the thirty-five millowners whose original occupational 
background I treced, twenty (63%) were originally bankers. Eight millowners (23%) in 
Ahmedabad were initially traders, but they were not guarantee brokers to British 
trading houses. Some of the millowners were known as speculators, but these cases 
were exceptional. We do not know the occupational background of others, or their 
background was a combination of banker, trader, and/or speculator.  
The banking background of Ahmedabad's cotton industrialists influenced the 
way the cotton mills were financed. Bombay mills were to a larger extent financed by 
banks and shareholders than those in Ahmedabad. This was mainly because a formal 
(western) banking system was more developed in Bombay than it was in Ahmedabad. 
However, the Ahmedabad millowners accumulated capital by deposits given by 
individuals against a fixed interest rate. Normally, these deposits were given for a 
period of three to twelve months. Up to the First World War, the public in 
Ahmedabad felt it was more secure to deposit their money with one of the 
Ahmedabadi bankers or millowners, than with a ’modern' bank.41 Most of the deposits 
were fairly small, given the fact that building an average cotton mill cost about Rs 
300.000 in Ahmedabad and most deposits were between Rs 500 and Rs 2000.  
The Ahmedabad moneylenders had developed strong personal relationships 
with the public in the city. This continued after they started to build cotton mills. 
Therefore, the Ahmedabad millowners relied much more on small deposit-holders 
than on shareholders or formal bankers than their Bombay counterparts. This shows 
that the banking background of Ahmedabad millowners influenced the way they 
financed their mills. (see Table 2) 
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Table 3 
Sources of Capital of Cotton mills in Bombay en Ahmedabad in 1930. 
 
Sources of capital Bombay x 1000Rs Percentage of total Ahmedabad x 1000 
Rs 
Percentage of total  
Borrowed by 
Managing Agents 
 
53, 2 
 
21 
 
26,4 
 
24 
Bankloan 22,6  9  4,2  4 
Deposits 27,3 11 42,6 39 
Shares 121,4 49 34,0 32 
Debentures 23,8 10  0,8  1 
Total 248,3 100% 108,0 100% 
Number of 
factories 
64  56  
Source: The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Commission, Calcutta 1931 vol1, p278. 
 
The close relationship between the Ahmedabad millowners and their small 
investors is confirmed by the fact that these investors shared in the commissions of 
managing agents in prosperous days. They did so although they were not compelled to 
formerly.  
 
(...) the Company will (...) in addition to the interest payable to the depositor 
on the said loan, pay each year to the depositor a share of the total 
commission calculated at the rate of 3% on the sale proceeds of all goods 
manufactured and sold by the company (...). 42  
 
 Furthermore, the Ahmedabad millowners developed a system in which they 
not only accepted deposits for three to twelve months, but for several years as well.43 
I did not come across any case in which Bombay managing agents shared commissions 
with their deposit holders or where deposit holders deposited their money for longer 
than one year. 
 
Tabel 4 Examples of the Ahmedabad Pattern: From Bankers to Industrialists 
Background of industrialists in Ahmedabad Family 
Finance Trade Financed first 
mill? 
Industrialist 
Sarabhai Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lalbhai Yes Yes No Yes 
Bhagubhai Yes No No Yes 
Source: Oonk (1998) 117. 
 
 
Thus, in Ahmedabad the occupational background of early industrialists was `banker', 
not `trader'. Furthermore, most of these industrialists had lived for generations in 
Ahmedabad. They were not migrants like the early capitalists in Bombay and 
Calcutta. Finally, in the case of Bombay one could argue that the ‘Protestant ethic' of 
the Parsis was an important factor in the emergence of industrialists in that city. In 
Ahmedabad, however, industrialisation started with two rather conservative Hindus. 
Hindus in ahmedabad did not have a minority status in Ahmedabad as the Parsis and 
Marwaris had in Bombay and Calcutta. 
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5.0 General conclusion and observations 
A systematic comparison of Calcutta, Bombay and Ahmedabad on the emergence of 
indigenous industrialists has, to my knowledge, never been done. In this paper, I 
contrasted these cities in various ways: first, the relation between European and 
Indian businessmen and second the occupational background of the indigenous 
industrialists-to-be and the way these businessmen became involved with industries. 
(1) A central issue in the Indian historiography is the question to what extend 
did the British colonial rule hindered or promoted Industrial development. In this 
paper I argue that:  
In Bombay, the relations between Indian and European businessmen were 
marked by less discrimination and less mutual antagonism than in Calcutta. This may 
be explained by the fact that the British conquered Western India at a later stage than 
Eastern India. Therefore, Indian businessmen in Bombay (as well as in Ahmedabad) 
escaped the early period of unabashed exploitation described by Bagchi. Furthermore, 
the British in Bombay realised that they could only develop the ‘fishing hamlet’, by 
interesting local businessmen, and they implemented an active policy to attract Parsis 
to settle in Bombay. In Bombay a symbiotic relation evolved in the development that 
many sons of Parsi businessmen worked for British managing agents. With the 
exception of the agency of Andrew Yule, this was hardly possible in Calcutta. In 
Ahmedabad, there was hardly any relation between British and European businessmen, 
though the relation between the civil servant Ranchhodlal with the British was 
important for his industrial outlook. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the contrasts between Bombay, 
Calcutta and Ahmedabad were clear: In Calcutta Indian businessmen were excluded 
from the upper ranks of the business hierachy and operated as brokers, but not as 
partners, while in Bombay partnerships between Europeans and Parsis were a 
common feature. The Parsis remained dominant in the opium and cotton trade with 
China. The imperial sun did not shape Ahmedabad. Here local businessmen were 
oriented towards the local markets and there was little commercial interest in what 
happened in Bombay. At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the first indigenous cotton mills were build by Indians in Bombay and Ahmedabad. It 
would take until 1919 before the first Indian mill (jute) was build. 
Thus in short: in Calcutta: colonial rule hampered indigenous 
industrialistation. In Bombay it promoted industrialisation (without the intention to 
do so); and in Ahmedabad it is not quit clear, but I think it is fair to state that the 
British developed a profitable environment with a stable a Government, tax 
structure and legislation. 
(2) A second central issue in the Indian historiography is the question how far the 
cultural; background of Indian entrepreneurs hampered or stimulated Industrial growth. 
Naturally this refers to the important theme promoted by Max Weber and followers. To put 
it bold: was Indian culture able to develop business groups with a rational, industrial outlook  
which was comparable to the one Weber described in his ideas on the ‘Protestant Ethic. 
In the case of the Marwaris in Calcutta and the Parsis in Bombay historians 
like Timberg, Taknet and Kulke argue that ‘ some elements of a ‘Protestant Ethic can 
be found in their cases. They refer to a sober life style; a long term view and a 
notion of investing and re-investing profits.  
These authors add that their  ‘stranger minority background’ may have added 
to the commercial outlook of these communities. Being ‘strangers’ meant a more 
object attitude towards the market; and being a minority could develop a strong 
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attitude for commercial improvement and even success. In both cities these 
businesscommunities were compared with the Jew in Europe. 
However these theories cannot explain the success of industrialists I 
Ahmedabad who came from the Hindu-majority background. Here they were not 
‘outsiders’ but insiders. Moreover, this also raises the question whether or not we 
have to define the Marwaris in Calcutta as insiders or outsiders? They were Hindus 
and Jains coming from Marwar; considered as ‘insiders’ by the Britishers but as 
outsiders by the Bengalis….. 
(3) In my Ph-D I opted to step out he discussion whether or not Weber and his 
followers were right or wrong in their view that Indian Religion hampered economic and 
Industrial development. I opted to describe the bakcground of Indian entrepreneurs in terms 
of occupational background. In this I showed that industrialisation was often a matter of 
diversification of their trading and backing activities.  
It will not come to a surprise that ‘industrialists-to-be’ had a background in 
finance and trade. This was the case in Calcutta, Bombay and in Ahmedabad. Because 
of highly diverse definitions and the extent of diversification of businessmen it is very 
difficult to distinguish between trading and banking background. However, a few 
observations can be made. 
Neither in Calcutta, nor in Ahmedabad did I come across the Bombay 
businessmen’s practice sending their sons to British agencies to ‘learn on the job’. This 
was an old tradition of Parsi business families and the fact that they sent their sons to 
British firms confirms their mutual relationship with the British. 
Furthermore, the Bombay businessmen were more internationally oriented 
than their Calcutta counterparts. In Bengal there seemed to be a division of markets, 
where the British monopolised the international market, and the Marwari traders 
occupied the inland market. This did not exist in Bombay to the same extent as it did 
in Calcutta. In Bombay the Indian traders almost monopolised the China market, 
initially with their opium trade and textiles, but eventually China served as a market 
for their fabrics. 
The Ahmedabad millowners had a strong banking background. Traditionally, 
they had developed a close relationship with the Ahmedabadi community who 
preferred to save their money with local bankers’ and moneylenders rather than 
formal banks. The Ahmedabad industrialists continued this relation while building 
cotton mills. To some extent, one might state that the mills were used as banks for 
small investors. Last but not least, in Calcutta and Bombay, the industrialists-to-be 
were migrants. They did not come from the local area. Unlike the Ahmedabad 
industrialists who were, with a few exceptions, local entrepreneurs. 
The monographs on the history of various business communities in India 
cannot explain the different patterns of industrialisation. In this paper I described three 
patterns: the Calcutta pattern, the Bombay pattern en the Ahmedabad pattern. These 
patterns varied in the nature of colonial relations; the caste and community 
background of various business communities and the way they entered the industry. 
These three parameters seem to me important variables in the study of a comparative 
history of industrialisation in India. 
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NOTES 
 
    1 By industrialisation I mean the use of mechanised power. In Calcutta, the Marwaris were able to build 
Jute-mills. In the case of the Bombay and Ahmedabad indigenous businessmen built up the local cotton 
industry. In general this means that the Indian entrepreneurs imported steam engines from Britain. By 
taking the industry as the unit of research, rather than one business community I avoided the problem of 
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as close business networks or specific family structures. 
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research on the Marwaris in Calcutta is included. I would like to thank my colleagues in the history 
department of Erasmus University for creating the right environment to write and develop new ideas 
and especially Prof. H.W. van Schendel for supervising my Ph.D. project. Ferry de Goey has become a 
fine and critical colleague during the years. I thank Ellen Bal for her support during the years. I wish to 
thank Prof. D. Tripathi and Prof. M.M. Mehta for their detailed comments and trust in a foreigner 
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1570-1940, 1996 Curzon Richmond; Hoselitz, B. ‘Entrepreneurs of Lebanon: the Role of Business 
Leaders in a developing economy,’ in Business History Review 1963 37 (3), 300; Louis, R.W. Imperialism. 
The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, 1976 New York. Schumpeter, J.A. The Theory of Economic 
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    4 By industrialisation I mean the use of mechanised power. In Calcutta, the Marwaris were able to build 
Jute-mills. In the case of the Bombay and Ahmedabad indigenous businessmen built up the local cotton 
industry. In general this means that the Indian entrepreneurs imported steam engines from Britain. By 
taking the industry as the unit of research, rather than one business community I avoided the problem of 
explaining the success of entrepreneurs by their caste or community bound qualities and expertise, such 
as close business networks or specific family structures. 
5 The Marwaris belong to various Hindu and Jain castes. During the second half of the nineteenth 
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century, they migrated from Marwar to East-India and settled as petit-traders and small businessmen. 
Within Marwar they were known by their specific caste name, both outside Marwar the are referred 
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